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RIOTS AND THE POLICE
By GRESHAM M. SYKES*
Drawing largely upon his varied experiences with the police
and their operations and upon his studies of riots in another self-
contained community - the prison - Dr. Sykes provides sobering
insight into the much discussed role of the police in creating the
tensions which lead to race riots. He suggests that the problem of
the police and riots is not just a matter of inadequate personnel -
that favorite whipping boy in the analysis of social problems. The
situation involves broader questions of political power, community
structure and the institutionalized functions of the police in the
structure and the institutionalized functions of the police in the ghetto
-questions which are not easily resolved by simplistic formulas.
I
The problems of the police in dealing with crime and the threat
of civil disorder in our cities have taken on a new urgency in this
era of drastic social change. And despite the variety we can observe
in the organization of the police and the special circumstances of
some cities, it is still possible to analyse the police and cities in gen-
eral. Many people in police work, it is true, are apt to think that
their police force is something quite special, that the problems they
confront are unique. But the similarity of police forces throughout
the country is probably more striking than any dissimilarity, and it is
certainly true that every major; city in the United States is now con-
fronted with a roughly similar set of social problems, so that it makes
sense to speak of the American urban crisis in which the police are
involved.
II
We can begin by pointing out that the social organization of the
police in the United States has certain basic features which pose seri-
ous difficulties for the effective performance of police functions even
under normal or routine conditions.
In the first place, a police force- unlike most social organiza-
tions- is scattered in space, fragmented into a thousand pieces.
Policemen do not do their work in one building or in one area; in-
stead, they are dispersed throughout the community as individuals
or as small, relatively autonomous units. In this respect, of course,
they are somewhat like a military organization in combat, but even
the military usually operates with units of at least squad or platoon
size. As a result, the police have severe and persistent problems of
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supervision, communication, and control, all of which serve to com-
plicate their job.'
In the second place, the police are scattered in time as well as
in space, for the police, unlike the great majority of social organiza-
tions, are in continuous operation on a three shift basis. Observers of
such round-the-clock enterprises (mainly in the area of industrial
organizations) indicate that there are severe managerial problems of
maintaining discipline, standards of performance, and so on.2
In the third place, in terms of social organization, police forces
have become monolithic structures,3 resisting the outside pressures
and the inward scrutiny which would increase efficiency. The police,
in this sense, are a solid, impenetrable object, presenting an almost
impervious surface to criticism of any sort. 4 Most social organizations
- or at least most of -the ones which are centered on the perform-
ance of crucial social functions - are divided in that there are major
cleavages or breaks within the organization itself which act as a kind
of control mechanism. In the Army, for example, we have officers
and enlisted men; in the business world we have labor and manage-
ment; in the university we have faculty and students. Each of these
segments, each of these parts of the organization, watches the other.
There is a system of surveillance within the organization, a system
of checks and balances, which helps to make the organization more
responsive to criticism, to the public airing of mismanagement, and
so on. Each of these organizational parts is quick to point out the
faults of the other - they help to keep one another honest. But all
this is largely lacking for the police. There is a division of sorts, it is
true, for there is of course a system of ranks; but if attacks come from
the outside, the police close ranks. "Never squeal on a fellow officer"
becomes all too often an overriding principle.5
One important consequence of all this is that much of the public
believes that any complaint against the police which is investigated
1 Reiss & Bordua, Environment and Organization: A Perspective on the Police, in THE
POLICE: SIx SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25, 50 (D. Bordua ed. 1967).
2 W. MOORE, MAN, TIME, & SOCIETY 95 (1963).
3 On police organization generally, see Reiss and Bordua, Environment and Organiza-
tion: A Perspective on the Police, in THE POLICE: SIx SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 25;
P. JACOBS, PRELUDE TO RIOT, A VIEW OF URBAN AMERICA FROM THE BOTTOM
50-51 (1968). On the related question of police solidarity, see J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL 52-54 (1966); Westley, Violence and the Police, 59 AM. J. SOCI-
OLOGY 34 '(1953) ; Wilson, The Police and Their Prohlems: A Theory, 12 PUBLIC
POLICY 189 (1963).
4 See, e.g., Clark, A Study of Police Isolation, 56 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 307 (1965)
M. BANTON, THE POLICEMAN IN THE COMMUNITY, chs. 7,8 (1965) on the isola-
tion of the British police; Levy, Cops in the Ghetto, A Prohlem of the Police System,
in RIOTS AND REBELLION, CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 353-54
(L. Masotti & D. Bowen eds. 1968); P. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 31, 36-46; D. BAY-
LEY & J. MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE, CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA
51, 135 (1969).
5 P. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 31, 36-46.
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by the police will turn out to be a whitewash - and sometimes the
public is right, as evidenced by the disclosures of police corruption
in the 1950's and 1960's. Corruption can exist in a police depart-
ment and go on for a long time because of extreme loyalty among
policemen at all levels. Furthermore, management reforms which
would make the police more efficient are frequently resisted, since
this would mean bringing in "outside" experts or accepting the con-
cept of lateral entry.6 Almost every top-ranking police official in a
police force must come from the bottom rank of that police force,
never from somewhere else - a most ancient and archaic notion that
ties an organization to a geographical area and has many unfortunate
consequences.
III
All of this is obvious enough, I think, although it is often for-
gotten when people ask why the police don't function more effec-
tively But in addition to the organizational problems which plague
the police, there are the problems which spring from the very nature
of police work itself.
Now it is possible to think of the police as having two main
functions. First, there is the task that most people think about, the
task of law enforcement - apprehending persons who have violated
the law and turning them over to the courts. And second, there is
the job of order maintenance- handling disputes and providing in-
formation, responding to complaints and handling crowds, and so on.7
There are a number of writers, such as Professor James Q. Wil-
son, who argue that no matter what the police might do in the next
5 or 10 years, it is very unlikely that they could become much
more effective than they are now in their job of law enforcement."
Only about 25 percent of all major crimes known to the police are
cleared by arrest,9 and it seems doubtful whether a great deal could
be done to raise that percentage. The largest number of crimes are
6 See, for instance, the overwhelming and successful objections of the Denver police
to a proposed reorganization plan reported in The Denver Post, Sept. 24, 1968, at 1,
col. 8. One of the proposed changes was to permit persons to "enter the departments
at levels suiting their special skills." Id., Sept. 17, 1968, at 18, col. 4.
7 See, J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 16 n.1 (1968). For a further de-
velopment of Wilson's ideas regarding the distinction between "law enforcement" and"order maintenance" and its significance, see Wilson, Dilemmas of Police Adminis-
tration, 18 PUB. AD. REV. 407 (1968). Michael Banton originally suggested that the
police may be said to function in the first instance as "law officers" and in the second
instance as "peace officers." M. BANTON, supra note 5, at 6-7, 127. See also, Bittner,
The Police on Skid-row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 699
(1967).
8 Wilson, supra note 7, at 407.
9 See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS- 1965, Table 8 at 97. A total
clearance rate of 26.3 percent is reported for seven major crimes. Clearance rates
varied from 90.5 percent for murder to 19.6 percent for larceny. Id. at 97.
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in the area of crimes against property,1" such as larceny, and these
are typically offenses which pose serious difficulties of detecting the
offender, no matter what resources are available. Pouring more police
into a given area may decrease the crime rate, but criminals are likely
to go elsewhere to commit their crimes, the decrease is likely to be
temporary, and it is simply too expensive a procedure, in any case,
to keep up for a prolonged period of time.
To a very large extent, then, changes in the crime rate appear
to have little or no relationship with what the police do or do not do.
The absence of police might indeed mean chaos, but a major expan-
sion of the police would probably have small consequences at best
- and any such consequence would be far overshadowed by changes
in the crime rate flowing from changes in social structure. For in-
stance, the proportion of the population aged 15 to 20 has increased
greatly in recent years, due to the high birth rates during and after
World War I,1 and it is this segment of the population that con-
tributes by far the largest share of crime.' Similarly, urban popula-
tions tend to commit more crimes than rural populations,'3 and the
percentage of the population living in cities (or in metropolitan
areas) in the United States increases every year. 14 And then, perhaps
most importantly, there is the question of just how much effect the
detection, apprehension, and punishment of the offender really has.
A number of studies suggest that at least 60 percent of men who have
been in prison keep on committing crimes when they get out.'" And
there is little evidence that more severe sentences would be a more
effective detrrent" - in England, 200 years ago, thieves took a pub-
lic execution not as a warning but as a welcome opportunity to pick
more pockets.17
When we turn to the task of order maintenance, the picture is no
more reassuring. This is a task which does not really involve crime,
10 D. TAFT & R. ENGLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 57 (1964).
11 R. THOMLINSON, POPULATION DYNAMICS, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 436-37 (1965).
12See discussion and qualification of this assertion in G. SYKES, CRIME AND SOCIETY
89-92 (2d ed. 1967). See also, Cressey, Crime, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS
136, 146 (2d ed. R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1961).
13 Cressey, supra note 12, at 155.
14 H. SHRYOCK, JR., POPULATION MOBILITY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES, 295-334
(1964).
15 D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964).
16 For an excellent and brief summary and analysis of the evidence of the deterrent effects
of punishment, see W. CHAMBLISS, CRIME AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 360-72 (1969).
Chambliss suggests that punishment or threat of punishment is likely to deter only
instrumental criminal acts (as opposed to expressive criminal acts such as murder,
rape, drunkenness, etc.) or acts performed by persons who have a high commitment
to a criminal mode of behavior.
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as I indicated earlier, but instead is concerned with family disputes,
controlling demonstrations, handling drunken quarrels, and so on.
As it turns out, this work is often more time-consuming for the police
than trying to combat crime and absorbs a large share of their re-
sources.18 The difficulty is that this work brings the police directly
into conflict with large segments of the presumably law-abiding
public, most notably the poor and members of minority groups. When
the police start intervening in these areas, there's bound to be some-
body who feels outraged or harassed. The Negro, for example, has
suffered from racial discrimination for so long that he's like a man
who has been flayed. He's sensitive to the slightest hint of an insult,
and, unfortunately, policemen are sometimes inexcusably heavy-
handed and insulting, even when they do not intend to be. The po-
lice, rightfully or wrongfully, come to be seen as a symbol of the
Establishment, as a symbol of all the forces that have worked against
the Negro and the Spanish-American in this country for so long. The
policemen stand as representatives of a conquering army; and a large
number of the people in the ghetto view their efforts to maintain
order with fear and hostility.
All of this presents a basic question - Can the police cure this
situation? Can they significantly reduce crime and maintain order
without community tension? I think it can be argued that the answer
is probably no, at least in the immediate years ahead. To a large
extent, I think these matters are beyond the control of the police.
We can put the matter another way. There are a number of
writers today who argue that the police are unqualified, unintelligent,
rude, brutal, and intolerant. And, it is argued, if police departments
were filled with college graduates, if there were more Negroes on
the police force, and if police departments were under greater control
of the neighborhoods where the police are carrying out their tasks,
most of our problems in police-community relationships would dis-
appear.' 9 It is quite possible, however, that this argument is wrong.
The problems would probably not disappear and they just might get
worse. The police might intervene more strictly than they do now
and increase community tensions. Negro officers might lean over
1 8 
TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 13 (1967).
See also, Bittner, The Police on Skid-row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOCIOL.
REV. (1967).
19 See, e.g., Levy, Cops in the Ghetto, A Problem of the Police System, in RIOTS AND
REBELLION, CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 347 (L. Masotti and D.
Bowen eds. 1968). James Q. Wilson characterizes these arguments as some variation
on the "bad men" theme. Wilson, Dilemmas of Police Administration, 18 PUB. AD.
REV. 407, 409 (1968). See also, A. NEIDERHOFFER, BEHIND THE SHIELD: THE POLICE
IN URBAN SOCIETY (1967), reviewed, Newman, 34 Am. SOCIOL. REV. 129 (1969)
(Newman is somewhat critical of the "bad men" theme he sees in Neiderhoffer's
book).
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backwards and be rougher on Negro offenders who were giving the
Negro community a bad name than would white officers. And the
conflict between neighborhood residents who want more police pro-
tection (small businessmen, home-owners, older people) and those
who want less (teenagers, young men hanging around on street cor-
ners, black militants) would not go away.
This does not mean that there is nothing to be done to help the
situation. In fact, there are a great many things that can be done by
the police and should be done. But I think we have to be realistic
about just how much can be accomplished by the police themselves;
and we must begin to understand that the problem of the police is
not just a matter of inadequate personnel - that favorite whipping
boy in the analysis of social problems - but involves questions of
political power and community structure.
IV
This leads to the major topic to be discussed - that is, the prob-
lem of riots and civil disorders. And I think we can come to a better
understanding of riots, of why they occur and what can and should
be done about them, if we examine an analogous attempt to maintain
law and order in a dangerous and perplexing situation.
Now for this we need a theory- although, unfortunately, the
social sciences do not have an explicit, definite, thoroughly proven
theory at the present time. But we can present the beginnings of a
theory for consideration and discussion, drawing on some ideas that
have been developed by studying prisons and prison riots.2" The
important thing is that for many people living in the ghetto, the
ghetto is a prison. The two situations are not so dissimilar and I think
we can learn from some of the similarities.
The starting point for the analysis of prison riots is just after
a riot has occurred. The rioters are subdued, the guards win back
control, the damage gets repaired, the broken glass is swept up -
and the prison administration is determined to enforce all the rules
and regulations, to follow a "tough" line. Men are to be in their
cells when they are supposed to be, there will be no loitering in the
passageways, there will be no gambling, and the passes needed to
move from one part of the institution to another will be examined
with care. There will be no illegal extras in the cells, there will be
no back talk from the inmates, and so on.
The prison administration then finds that it cannot run the prison
with this sort of a strict regime. They cannot use force or the threat
20 G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES, A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON
(1958). See also. Hartung and Floch, A Social-Psychological Analysis of Prison Riots:
An Hypothesis, 47 J. QRIM. L.C. & P.S. 51 (1956).
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of force to accomplish all the tasks that must be performed within
the prison walls. They cannot use force to move 2,000 men through
a mess hall, just as they cannot use force - one guard with a gun
behind each inmate - to run the prison's machinery. Somehow, they
must persuade inmates to do what they are supposed to do; and this
means using some kind of a system of rewards and punishments.
But the rewards - the legal rewards - in the prison are very
few. It is hard to use the maximum daily wage (often in the neighbor-
hood of thirty cents a day) as a meaningful motivating drive. There
are very few extra privileges which can legitimately be given. There
is Good Time (time off a sentence for good behavior), but all that
lies far in the future so that it is like a pension plan with all the con-
comitant difficulties of motivating people in the immediate present.
There is Work Time (time off a sentence for appearing on the job),
but it hardly assures conscientious work. And the punishments, too,
are sharply limited - these men are already being punished close to
to the limits permitted by society. So in this sense the inmates in the
prison and the Negro and the Spanish-American in the ghetto have
a good deal in common - they all live in a world of reduced incen-
tives, both positive and negative.
How, then, can men be induced to keep the cellblock clean, to
keep out of fights, to do the sweeping, the cooking, the barbering,
etc.? The answer in the prison is frequently a system of small favors,
of letting an inmate leader know when a search for stolen goods is
about to take place, for example, so that he can pass the word on to
his friends much in the manner of a ward boss dispensing patronage.
The guards ignore minor infractions, such as gambling, minor theft,
and so on; and in return, the inmates help to keep things running
smoothly. 21 The prisoners, no less than their guards, want to "pull
their own time," to "pull an easy bit."
In short, the prison is made more tolerable, the frustrations re-
duced by not enforcing all the rules too strictly -and, most im-
portantly, a group of inmate leaders is allowed to come into exist-
ence who has an important stake in maintaining a quiet and orderly
institution and who has access to a set of rewards to buttress their
position of leadership.
This situation, however, tends to be unstable in the prison. In-
mates may gain so much power that in reality they run the prison,
not the guards or the prison administrative staff. There inevitably
comes a demand for a crack-down, for a get-tough policy. A guard
21 Compare the use of "small favors" in enhancing administrative control in a bureau-
cratic organization described in P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY, A STUDY
OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS IN Two GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 169 (1955). See
also, P. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 16 (1964).
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may be killed or a guard may be fired and go to the newspapers with
lurid stories of prison scandals. "Reforming the prison" or some other
version of "law and order" may become a part of a political campaign.
In any event, the prison authorities will frequently find them-
selves pushed to regain control of the prison, to enforce the rules
more strictly - and they are then driven to do away with the whole
system of compromises, of informal arrangements of a favor for a
favor which has helped to keep the prison on an even keel. The in-
mate leaders are discredited, and their privileges (which are an im-
portant basis of their power) are taken away. The result, very often,
is a disaster.
The destruction of the usual inmate leaders leaves a vacuum of
power, of leadership. All the frustrations of prison life begin to bite
more sharply on the general inmate population; and into the vacuum
of leadership there rush the wildest, most violent inmates who fan
the sparks of unrest. The inevitable discontents of prison life crystalize
around these new, bitterly hostile spokesmen and the prison explodes
into a riot.
The prisoners, of course, cannot really win - and they know
this in some fundamental sense. The prison authorities have far
greater resources at their command and they can always call on the
National Guard or the Army if things get too serious. But usually
they can keep the rioting inmates confined to one part of the prison
where they can be starved into submission. Hostages, of course, pose
another problem -a problem, incidentally, which has not yet
occurred in the civil disorders in the cities.
So the riot gets broken. The guards win back control, the dam-
age gets repaired, the broken glass is swept up, the ringleaders get
locked into solitary confinement or consigned to the hospital for the
criminally insane. And the whole cycle starts all over again. The in-
mates are much the way they were before, the prison rules and regu-
lations are much the same - and the future holds little more than a
promise of endless frustration, disturbances, and repression.
As I have suggested, many of our cities today present something
of the same picture - similar enough, at any rate, to point to some
possible conclusions.
In the first place, no community, whether it is a prison or a city,
can be run by force alone over any prolonged period of time, in any
sort of stable fashion. The fact that such an arrangement runs counter
to our democratic values is important, but so too is the fact that the
continued existence of a government based on force alone is virtually
impossible. To some extent - probably to a very large extent -
people in a community must agree to the rules and be willing to co-
operate with the agencies of government." This is a proposition,
1969
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incidentally, which I think can be shown to be true even for a con-
centration camp. 8
In the second place, this cooperation and acceptance of the gov-
erning powers requires the development of leadership within the
ghetto - that is, within the Black community and, in some cities, the
Spanish-American community as well. We are familiar with the con-
cept from the viewpoint of a theory of administration in terms of
span of control. 4 We are perfectly aware that there must be some
kind of a pyramid-like structure in an organization; and something
of the same thing must be true, in a political sense, in a community
- at least, in a democratic society. There must be centers of control
and of power and influence down at the neighborhood level, if the
system is to cohere. Voluntary associations of all sorts have tradi-
tionally served part of this role in American society - churches and
political groups, clubs and lodges, unions, occupational associations,
and so on. If these are destroyed we are left with a handful of rulers
and the great -mass of the ruled - essentially a vacuum of leadership
into which can rush the most unstable and most dangerous elements
in the community.
28
In the third place, it appears quite possible that a lack of ac-
cepted, trusted leaders in the minority group community was - and
is - an important element in the disturbances that are racking the
cities in this country.2 6 All too often it would appear that the White
community - the Establishment - has had very little knowledge of,
or interest in, the structure of leadership in the Black community or
the Spanish-American community. In fact, it sometimes seems as if
the so-called Establishment were deliberately trying to smash flat any
such structure coming into existence, in the most short-sighted, self-
defeating manner imaginable.
There is a great deal of loose talk, for example, about "militants,"
"extremists," and so on, in newspapers throughout the country. We
are all guilty of using such words, because they are a convenient sort
of shorthand. But very few people try to tie those words down pre-
cisely and see what they mean - and the police, I think, are about
as bad as anybody about this. The rhetoric, the speech-making of the
22 G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE, A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 51-58
(1966). See also, Becker, Who Makes the Rules? in LAW AND THE LAWLESS, A
READER IN CRIMINOLOGY 113 (G. Sykes & T. Drabek eds. 1969).
2
3See generally, E. KOGON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HELL (Berkeley ed. 1958).
24 See, W. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORATION 48 (1962).
2W. KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY 236-37 (1959). See also, N.
BABCHUK & C. GORDON, THE VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION IN THE SLUM (1962).
28 Harry Scoble has suggested that the Watts Riot of 1965 constituted the "accelerated
completion of an age-generational revolution peacefully initiated against 'traditional'
Negro leadership (during 1962-1963)." Scoble, Effects of Riots on Negro Leadership,
in RIOTS AND REBELLION, CIVIL VIOLENCE IN THE URBAN COMMUNITY 329, 330
(L. Masotti & D. Bowen eds. 1968).
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Black Panthers, for example, is often taken completely at face value,
with few attempts to understand why the speeches are being made
and what they really mean. It reminds me of the psychiatrist, Dr.
Wertham, in his work with children and comic books. Dr. Wertharn
said that the comic books were obviously bad because one small
reader, when asked what he wanted to be when he grew up, told
Dr. Wertham he wanted to be a sex maniac. But all that proves, as
the critic Warshow pointed out, is that Dr. Wertham will believe
what any 6-year-old boy will tell him.27
What is really needed is a great deal more knowledge about
what is going on in our community, both Black and White, and
we must use this knowledge to support a strong and vigorous leader-
ship in the ghetto, if we are not to leave a vacuum of leadership
which will explode into mob action. And "supporting leadership"
does not simply mean picking people you like or who happen to
agree with you right down the line.
There is a question of the extent to which Black Panthers or
any other group is a leadership element in the community - and just
what kind of leadership it is likely to provide. Actually, I think that
is strictly an empirical question and the answer is going to vary from
one particular community to another - and probably from one point
in time to another. In general, however, I think the striking thing is
the hostility which a great many policemen direct against the Black
Power movement in its various forms and against militant Black
spokesmen .
28
A number of explanations have been offered for this hostility,
such as the lower middle class origin of the policeman and a pervasive
racial prejudice.2 9 There is the resentment against the attempts to
aid the Negro economically on the part of those who have not been
notably successful in this affluent society but who are still not below
the poverty line -the sort of thing which was supposed to be so
much behind the support of Wallace and with whom, it has been
claimed, so many policemen identified themselves. And, of course,
there is the fact that the police believe - sometimes correctly - that
it is the Black militants who are sniping at them.30 I think we can
take it as a rather basic principle that people do not like people who
shoot at them or who are thought to be doing so.
27 See, F. WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954); Warshow, PAUL, THE
HORROR COMICS, AND DR. WERTHAM, 17 COMMENTARY 596 (1954).
2 See generally, The Police and the Rest of Us, An Atlantic Supplement, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1969, at 74.
2 See Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals- and Vice Versa, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
March 1969, at 76-83.
3o Id. at 82.
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The fact that these are rather glib and easy explanations should
not blind us to the strong probability that there is some truth in them
- but they are not enough. I do not think it is enough to explain
the depth of the hostility or its nature. Shortly after lecturing in a
one-week training institute for the police on police and minority
group relationships, I spoke to one of the policemen in the hall about
the breakdown in communications between the police and the Black
militants. I asked him how the police could keep order in such a
polarized community; and he said, with a bitter and quiet anger,
"We can always lock 'em up for treason."
A large share of the explanation, I think, must look to the fact
that the police are tremendously concerned with their position as
agents of legitimate authority. If they use force in the control of
crime, they really do believe that the force must represent the im-
personal and just control of the state - and not a kind of scuffling
between two contending mobs. It must be clear to the police that they
uphold the public definition of "right" (or what they think is the
public definition) and that the criminal is "wrong." And that is to
say that the police see themselves engaged in a moral combat to a
much greater extent than most people realize. The police cannot
simply be the professional users of force for any end that happens
to be announced by community officials - the police, I am arguing,
must believe that the end is legitimate, that the end is morally correct.
This does not mean that the use of force cannot get brutally out of
hand, as in Chicago. But it does mean that the police tend to see the
victims of that force as "wrong" -and that this is not merely a
rationalization for brutal behavior.
8 1
The same need is found, I think, in what I have called the main-
tenance of order. The police believe that they must rely on maintain-
ing a position of impersonal authority which does not carry a partisan
taint. Firm, fair, just - and above all representative of the com-
munity's standards of proper behavior; that is what police so fre-
quently believe they must appear to be.
Now I would suggest that when the police are asked to reach
out to so-called militant elements in the ghetto, they often feel that
they are being asked to compromise their position of moral supremacy.
To work out any kind of a modus vivendi with vehement, lower class
Black leaders is, in effect, to bring what they define as a criminal
class into a position of legitimacy - and, for the police, this is fre-
31 John Q. Wilson writes: "In order to maintain morale the officer may have to rely
increasingly on police doctrine, a perhaps exaggerated conception of the rightness of
what he is doing, and a contempt for both the criminal and hypocritical noncriminal
elements of the population." Wilson, Police Morale, Reform, and Citizen Respect:
The Chicago Case, in THE POLICE: SIX SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYs 137, 161 (D. Bordua
ed. 1967).
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quently intolerable. It is like asking a man who has been cuckolded
to sit down with his wife's lover and discuss how to bring up chil-
dren. The adulterer may indeed know a good deal about it, but the
husband is not inclined to listen to him.
V
In conclusion, I think it is possible to argue that police harrass-
ment is not the cause of urban unrest any more than the reform of
the police is a quick and easy answer for our problems. What is im-
portant, I think, is the political relationship and the power relation-
ship between the white, affluent society and the poor, minority-group
community. I have suggested that if anyone tries to make that rela-
tionship one of harsh and complete repression, they will create a
situation which is far more explosive, far more pregnant with vio-
lence, than anything we have seen so far. And the crucial thing, it
seems to me, is that the country must learn that in its present concern
for law and order, the police are only one small part of a larger set
of problems which cannot be solved by coercion.
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